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Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1988 Term
Robert E. Riggs*
Mark T. Urban**
J.

INTRODUCTION

This article is the third annual survey of Supreme Court voting
behavior presented by the BYU journal of Public Law. 1 As in previous
years, it examines the positions taken by individual justices of the
United States Supreme Court on selected categories of cases decided
during the immediately preceding term. The classification scheme is
designed to provide indicators of the justices' views on important
dimensions of constitutional interpretation and individual rights. Nine
of the categories are based on the nature of the issues or the character
of the parties. A tenth category, added last year, tabulates the number
of times each member of the Court joined with the majority during the
past (1988) term in thirty-four decisions that could have been reversed
had any member of the majority coalition voted instead with the minority. The issue and party categories are as follows:
1) Civil controversies in which a state, or one of its officials or
political subdivisions, is opposed by a private party.
2) Civil controversies in which the federal government, or one of
its agencies or officials, is opposed by a private party.
3) State criminal cases.
4) Federal criminal cases.
5) First amendment issues of speech, press, association, and free
exercise of religion.
6) Equal protection issues.
7) Statutory civil rights claims.
8) Issues of federal court jurisdiction, standing, justiciability and
related matters.
* Robert E. Riggs is a Professor of Law, Brigham Young University, B.A., 1952, M.A.,
1953, University of Arizona; Ph.D., 1955, University of Illinois; LL.B., 1963, University of
Arizona.
** Mark T. Urban received his B.A., 1987, Brigham Young University, and is a candidate
for graduation, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1991.
The authors acknowledge the research assistance of Duane L. Ostler.
1. Riggs, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1986 Term, 2 BYU J. Pus. L. 15 (1988); Riggs
and Moss, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1987 Term, 3 BYU J. Pus. L. 59 (1989).
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9) Federalism issues.
Tables 1-9 present voting data for these nine issue-related categories.
Table 10 deals with the swing-vote cases.
Each of the first nine categories is intended to reveal attitudes of
the justices toward two super-issues which are relevant to most Supreme Court decision-making-individual rights and judicial restraint.
Criminal prosecutions, as well as claims arising under the first amendment, equal protection clause, and civil rights statutes, have an obvious
relevance for individual rights. The relationship between individual
rights and the two categories of civil cases, where governmental and
private interests conflict, is perhaps less obvious because facts and circumstances of individual cases vary greatly. Nevertheless, a relationship
exists because, even in civil cases, the preference for a governmental
party is usually at the expense of persons claiming rights against the
government. The same is true of the federalism category. A vote for the
state is likely to be a vote against a person seeking federal relief from
alleged state encroachment upon his rights.
Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference to legislatures as the policy-making branch of government, respect for precedent,
avoidance of constitutional questions when narrower grounds for decision exist, avoidance of unnecessary decisions, and respect for the framers' intent (when ascertainable) in construing constitutional text. 2 Judicial restraint, as a hands-off policy, is more likely to favor the
government as constituted authority than the individual who claims
rights against the government. When the issue is whether to strike
down a state law under the preemption doctrine, judicial restraint
would usually dictate respect for the role of states within the federal
system.
Judicial restraint and concern for individual rights are not necessarily opposite poles of a single attitudinal dimension. Concern for precedent, avoidance of constitutional questions and unnecessary decisions,
deference to states, and allegiance to the framers' intent could cut either
way with respect to individual rights, depending on the facts. Still,
there is a good deal of tension between the concerns. Deference to legislatures frequently means rejection of an individual's claim, especially
one predicated upon the impropriety of governmental action. Emphasis
upon the framers' intent can mean unwillingness to read new individual rights into the Constitution. Reluctance to exercise federal court
jurisdiction may leave the decision to state courts, with their possible
2. For an extensive discussion of judicial restraint, see Lamb, judicial Restraint on the SuSUPREME COURT ACTIVISIM AND RESTRAINT 7 (S. Halpern & C. Lamb eds.
1982).

preme Court, in

SUPREME COURT VOTING

1]

3

bias in favor of actions by state governments, and the almost certain
disappointment of the claimant seeking federal intervention. In the voting tabulations that follow, most of the data supporting an inference of
judicial restraint, or the lack of it, will also be consistent, respectively,
with a narrow or a broad view of individual rights.

II.

THE VOTING RECORD
TABLE 1

CIVIL CASES: STATE GOVERNMENT
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY
Justice

Number of Votes, 1988 Term %Votes for Government
For Gov't Against Gov't
1988
1987
1986
Term Term Term

Rehnquist
Scalia
O'Connor
Kennedy
White
Stevens
Blackmun
Marshall
Brennan

32
29
27
28
27
17
15
10
10

16
20
20
21
22
31
34
37
39

66.7
59.2
57.4
57.1
55.1
35.4
30.6
21.3
20.4

67.9
51.7
50.0
50.0
53.6
37.9
44.8
34.5
34.5

71.8
64.1
64.1

Majority
Split Decisions
Unanimous

25
16
9

24
9
15

51.0
64.0
37.5

51.7
58.8
41.7

53.9

43.6
46.2
36.8
30.8
33.3
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TABLE 2
CIVIL CASES: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY
Justice

Number of Votes, 1988 Term o/o Votes for Government
1987
1986
For Gov't Against Gov't
1988
Term Term Term

Rehnquist
White
Kennedy
O'Connor
Blackmun
Scalia
Stevens
Marshall
Brennan

20
20
18
17
17
16
12
11
10

8
8
9
11
11
11
16
17
17

71.4
71.4
66.7
60.7
60.7
59.3
42.9
39.3
37.0

61.8
72.7
58.3
76.5
50.0
62.5
55.9
44.1
45.5

90.6
87.1

Majority
Split Decisions
Unanimous

18
10
8

10
5
5

64.3
66.7
61.5

61.8
55.6
68.8

68.8

75.0
53.1
82.8
50.0
46.9
43.8

TABLE 3
STATE CRIMINAL CASES
Justice

Number of Votes, 1988 Term o/o Votes for Government
For Gov't Against Gov't
1987
1986
1988
Term Term Term

Rehnquist
Kennedy
O'Connor
White
Scalia
Blackmun
Stevens
Brennan
Marshall

23
22
21
21
20
10
10
5
4

4
5
6
6
7
17
17
22
23

85.2
81.5
77.8
77.8
74.1
37.0
37.0
18.5
14.8

73.7
70.0
61.1
47.4
63.2
26.3
21.1
5.3
5.3

Majority
Split Decisions
Unanimous

19
16
3

8
6
2

70.4
72.7
60.0

47.4
53.8
16.7

87.9
75.8
81.8
75.8
30.3
21.2
3.0
3.0
60.6
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TABLE 4
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
Justice

Number of Votes, 1988 Term
For Gov't Against Gov't

o/o Votes for Gov't
1988
1987
1986
Term Term Term

Kennedy
Rehnquist
White
O'Connor
Scalia
Stevens
Blackmun
Marshall
Brennan

8
8
8
7
6
6
5
3
2

1
1
1
2
3
3
4
6
6

88.9
88.9
88.9
77.8
66.7
66.7
55.6
33.3
25.0

Majority
Split Decisions
Unanimous

8
6
2

1
0
1

88.9
100.0
66.7

71.4
85.7
85.7
71.4
64.3
64.3
78.6
28.6
38.5
78.6
75.0
100.0

80.0
90.0
90.0
70.0
40.0
30.0
0.0
0.0
60.0

TABLE 5
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF EXPRESSION,
ASSOCIATION, AND FREE EXERCISE
Justice

Number of Votes, 1988 Term
For Claim Against Claim

Brennan
Marshall
Stevens
Blackmun
Kennedy
Scalia
O'Connor
White
Rehnguist
Majority
Split Decisions
Unanimous

13
13
11
7
6
6
4
4
3
6
2
4

3
4
6
10
10
11
12
13
13
11
7
4

o/o Votes for Rights
Claim
1987
1986
1988
Term Term Term
81.3
76.5
64.7
41.2
37.5
35.3
25.0
23.5
18.8
35.3
22.2
50.0

84.6
84.6
50.0
69.2
66.7
38.5
23.1
30.8
16.7
50.0
50.0
50.0

91.7
91.7
50.0
72.7
36.4
45.5
41.7
16.7
58.3
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TABLE 6
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS
Justice

Number of Votes, 1988 Term
For Claim Against Claim

O'Connor
Stevens
White
Blackmun
Kennedy
Rehnquist
Scalia
Brennan
Marshall

4
4
4
3
4
4
4
3
3

Majority
Split Decisions
Unanimous

4
1
3

2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
0
3
TABLE 7

% Votes for Rights

1988
Term

1987
Term

66.7
66.7
66.7
60.0
57.1
57.1
57.1
50.0
50.0

12.5
28.6
12.5
50.0
33.3
12.5
12.5
37.5
37.5

57.1
100.0
50.0

12.5
0.0
20.0

Claim
1986
Term
42.9
33.3
28.6
57.1
14.3
14.3
71.4
71.4
14.3

STATUTORY CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS

Justice

Number of Votes, 1988 Term
For Claim Against Claim

% Votes for Rights

1988
Term

Brennan
Marshall
Blackmun
Stevens
White
O'Connor
Kennedy
Scalia
Rehnguist

19
17
16
14
11
10
9
8
7

1
1
4
5
9
9
11
12
13

95.0
94.4
80.0
73.7
55.0
52.6
45.0
40.0
35.0

Majority
Split Decisions
Unanimous

10
3
71

10
9
87.5

50.0
25.0
100.0

1987
Term
87.5
87.5
87.5
87.5
62.5
42.9
66.7
57.1
37.5
75.0
60.0

Claim
1986
Term
84.6
84.6
84.6
61.5
61.5
30.8
38.5
38.5
53.9
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TABLE 8
CASES RAISING A CHALLENGE TO
THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
Number of Votes, 1988 T~rm o/o Votes for Jurisdiction
1987
For
Against
1988
1986
Term
Term
Term
.I urisdiction .I urisdiction
Marshall
27
57.1
57.1
9
75.0
Stevens
27
73.0
57.1
10
71.4
Brennan
66.7
60.7
24
12
62.8
Blackmun
64.9
58.1
64.3
24
13
White
23
14
62.2
71.4
51.2
O'Connor
18
17
51.4
42.9
64.3
Kennedy
19
51.4
56.3
18
Rehnquist
47.6
67.9
19
51.4
18
Scalia
18
50.0
36.6
61.5
18
Majority
23
14
62.2
55.8
60.7
Split Decisions
62.5
71.4
10
6
Unanimous
61.9
48.3
13
8
TABLE 9

Justice

FEDERALISM CASES
Number of Votes, 1988 Term %Votes for State Claim
For
Against
1988
1987
1986
State
Federal
Claim
Claim
Term Term Term
Rehnquist
17
4
81.0
46.2
Scalia
76.2
16
5
30.8
O'Connor
14
5
73.7
33.3
Kennedy
16
6
72.7
33.3
White
14
63.6
8
30.8
Stevens
12
9
57.1
46.2
Blackmun
9
13
40.9
46.2
Marshall
7
14
33.3
53.8
Brennan
7
15
31.8
53.8
Majority
13
9
59.1
38.5
Split Decisions
6
6
50.0
33.3
Unanimous
7
3
70.0
42.9

Justice

8

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 4

TABLE 10
SWING-VOTE ANALYSIS: WHO VOTES MOST OFTEN
WITH THE MAJORITY IN CLOSE CASES
Justice

Kennedy
O'Connor
Rehnquist
White
Scalia
Blackmun
Brennan
Stevens
Marshall

Number of Votes, 1988 Term o/o Votes with Majority
1987
1986
1988
With
Against
Term Term Term
Majority
Majority
6
8
8
8
9
21
25
25
26

28
26
26
26
25
13
9
9
8

III.

82.4
76.5
76.5
76.5
73.5
38.2
26.5
26.5
23.5

71.4
64.5
70.0
77.4
66.7
45.2
40.0
61.3
38.7

ANALYSIS

A list of cases included in each of the ten tables, and the criteria
governing their selection, are presented in an appendix to this article.
Each case was read and coded by three readers, and differences were
discussed in order to achieve consensus on the appropriate classification. The result undoubtedly falls short of perfect validity and reliability, but we believe that other readers using the same coding criteria
would arrive at substantially the same results. Still, some difficult
problems of judgment remain. For example, in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 3 four justices voted to remand a Title VII sex discrimination
case because the petitioner employer had been held to a standard of
"clear and convincing" evidence, rather than merely a "preponderance," in meeting its burden of persuasion. Two justices concurred,
though disagreeing with the plurality in some respects, and three justices dissented because they would have reversed outright in favor of the
employer. Since the employer was the petitioner, all nine in some sense
voted in favor of the employer and against the employee's claim. The
case nevertheless was coded six votes for the respondent-employee's
statutory civil rights claim and three votes against because the six were
3. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
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considerably more sympathetic to the claim than the three dissenters.
This seemed the best way to reflect the impact of the dissent and the
very real differences among the members of the Court. At the same
time, grouping the two concurrences with the four in the plurality ignored differences among those justices. Most of the decisions fit with
little distortion into a dichotomous classification of "for" or "against,"
but a few, like Hopkins, leave room for legitimate difference of opinion
how a particular justice's "vote" should be coded.
With that caveat, a brief discussion of the statistical tables may be
helpful. The first four tables represent categories which are, for the
most part, mutually exclusive: a case coded in one of the categories is
unlikely to be included in any of the other three. By definition, a case
would not be categorized as both civil and criminai,4 nor would a case
on appeal involve a simultaneous federal and state prosecution. However, a civil suit having a private party on one side and both a state and
a federal agency or official on the other is not inconceivable. One case
of that nature was decided during the 1988 term, 11 and was included in
both Tables 1 and 2. In contrast, the last five tables do not comprise
mutually exclusive categories either among themselves or with the party
categories. A case raising more than one relevant issue is included in
each relevant category. For example, an action by a private party
against a state might raise issues pertaining to the first amendment,
equal protection, and jurisdiction. If so, it would be included in all
three issue tables! as well as in Table 1 (state v. private party). The
voting alignment would not necessarily be the same for each issue. 6 In a
number of instances a case was coded more than once in the same category. This occurred when the facts raised two or more distinct issues
affecting the disposition of the case and the issues were decided by differing voting alignments. 7
4. In two cases we had difficulty deciding whether the action was civil or criminal. Both were
ultimately placed in the criminal tables. See United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
5. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989). Both a
state and a federal agency were named respondents.
6. For example, in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989), the Court was
unanimous on the jurisdictional issue but divided 6-3 in holding that the Texas sales tax exemption for religious periodicals violated the establishment clause. In the 1988 term no case was included in more than four categories.
7. For example, Sable Communications v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 109 S. Ct.
2829 (1989), the dial-a-porn case, raised two separate first amendment questions: I) whether
"indecent" material could be totally banned from the telephone lines, and 2) whether "obscene"
material could be banned. The Court gave a unanimous "no" to the first question, and a 6-3
"yes" to the second. The case is therefore tabulated twice in Table 2 and twice in Table 5, because
the Court voted against the government on one first amendment issue and for the government on
the other.
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The results of the analysis lend themselves primarily to discussion
within categories, but given the widespread public commentary on the
Court's shift toward greater conservatism this term, an appraisal of that
trend in light of our data may be appropriate. As the decisions are
analyzed in our tables, a conservative position would ordinarily be inferred from a vote favoring the government, a vote against a claim of
constitutional or statutory rights, a vote against the exercise of jurisdiction, and a vote in favor of state (rather than federal) authority on
federalism questions. There are, however, exceptions to this general
rule. Some decisions were unanimous, indicating that the law or the
facts of the case, or both, pointed so clearly one way that there was
little room for play of liberal or conservative ideologies. In other cases,
much fewer in number, the peculiar nature of the facts created a reverse of the expected relationship, with liberals opposing a civil rights
claim, for example, and conservatives supporting the claim. A good illustration is the City of Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 8 in which a
white-owned construction company brought action to void the city's
30o/o minority set-aside requirement for city construction contracts,
claiming it violated the company's equal protection rights. The issue
was reverse discrimination, and the decision in favor of the contractor
was widely regarded as a set-back for affirmative action. On these facts
the three most liberal members of the Court-Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun-voted for the government and against the equal
protection claim, while the remaining six, including the most conservative members of the Court, voted against the government and for the
contractor's equal protection claim. Despite such exceptional cases, the
expected general correlation between ideology and voting is apparent in
most of the tables.
The voting of individual justices can be compared with each other
for any given year, but a shift in the orientation of the Court or its
members requires a comparison over time. For our analysis the best
available baseline is the comparable data generated for the two prior
years. In the tables this information appears in the form of percentages
for each justice and, in all but the swing-vote table, for the Court majority. One must use caution in interpreting the data because the percentages are affected not only by the behavior of the individual justices
but also by the nature of the cases decided in a given year. A vote to
uphold a greater percentage of criminal convictions than in a previous
term may mean that the justice or the Court has become tougher on
criminal defendants. Alternatively, it may mean only that this year the
8. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
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facts or the law (or both) of a number of individual cases were less
favorable to the defendant than in previous years. The same is true of
other categories of cases. Hence, one cannot be confident that percentage changes from one year to another reflect a change in ideological
orientation of an individual justice, or of the Court majority. Similar
directional changes across a number of tables, however, would
strengthen the hypothesis that a genuine shift in attitude has occurred.
This is true because variation in the nature of the cases should be random and thus is unlikely to account for a pronounced directional
change in several tables.
This year a directional change is apparent for the Court as a
whole, as indicated by the percentage figures in the bottom three rows
of each table, which show how the majority of the Court voted. The
first of the three rows gives figures on all cases included in the tables;
the second row is limited to decisions with one or more dissenting votes;
and figures in the bottom row are calculated only from cases with no
dissent. For all cases a statistical shift toward a more conservative result
appears, as compared with the two preceding years, in the following
tables: state criminal and federal criminal (Tables 3 and 4), first
amendment (Table 5), statutory civil rights (Table 7), and federalism
(Table 9). 9 No significant change appears with respect to the two categories of civil cases (Tables 1 and 2) or the jurisdictional questions
(Table 8). In Table 8 the modest shift from the previous year runs in
the liberal direction, toward more expansive jurisdiction. Table 6, dealing with equal protection, shows a large percentage difference from the
two preceding terms, also in a liberal rather than a conservative
direction.
Most of the apparent inconsistency in the trends indicated by the
tables is eliminated when percentages are calculated separately for cases
in which a dissenting vote was cast. Excluding unanimous decisions
(including decisions in which fewer than the nine justices participated
or reached the issue) separately has the disadvantages inherent in a
smaller universe of cases, but the advantage of including only those in
which ideological differences might have affected the outcome. When
only split decisions are counted, every category except equal protection
displays a more conservative result for the 1988 term than for 1987.
The equal protection table (Table 6) can also be explained in a
way that removes any real inconsistency, by examining only non-unanimous cases. During the 1987 term the equal protection issue was addressed eight times, but in only three cases was it resolved by a divided
9. Data collection for the federalism category was not begun until the 1987 term. Riggs and
Moss, supra note 1.

12

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 4

court. 10 Two of the split decisions, involving school busing fees 11 and
food stamps for strikers, 12 were resolved in favor of the conservative
position (rejecting equal protection challenges to the busing fees and the
denial of food stamps); and the third, upholding Mississippi's statutory
15o/o penalty assessed upon unsuccessful appeal of a lower court judgment/3 was opposed only by Justice Blackmun (Justices Stevens and
Kennedy not participating). The ideological content of that issue must
have been ambiguous because Justices Brennan and Marshall joined
the conservatives. The party claiming equal protection was a large business corporation, obviously not well placed to appeal to the liberal justices' sympathy for the underdog. With rejection of the equal protection
claim in every non-unanimous 1987 case, there was no room for improvement of the conservative position in 1988. The percentages, in
fact, show a complete reversal of position. But here the appearance belies reality. Only one equal protection case was decided during the 1988
term by a divided vote. Table 6 shows the vote going in favor of that
claim, which is correct, but the case was City of Richmond, the minority set-off reverse discrimination case. Hence a vote for equal protection
was a conservative vote, and the score, based only on non-unanimous
decisions, again was conservatives 100o/o, liberals Oo/o.
These data indicate that the conservative shift of the Court during
the 1988 term is not limited to a few select cases but is statistically
apparent across a wide range of cases. The swing-vote table also confirms this directional movement. Looking at the percentage figures for
individual justices, the conservative members voted more frequently
with the majority than did the liberals in both the 1987 and 1988
terms, along with Justice White (a conservative on some issues but a
swing voter on others, over the years). However, for the 1987 term a
gradual decline in the percentage of majority voting is evident from one
justice to the next in order. Only three percentage points separate Justice O'Connor (generally regarded as a conservative) from Justice Stevens (in the past a swing-voter, but with a liberal orientation); and the
largest break-sixteen percentage points-is between Justices Stevens
and Blackmun. 14 By contrast, for the 1988 term, there is a 35 percentage point break between the lowest conservative (Scalia) and the high10. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988); Bankers Life and Casualty
Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S. Ct. 1645 (1988); Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 108 S. Ct. 1184
(1988).

II. Kadrmas, supra note I 0.
12. Lyng, supra note 10.
13. Bankers Life and Casualty, supra note I 0.
14. The ordering of justices for the 1987 term can be gleaned from Table 10 only with some
effort because the members of the Court are listed in order of their 1988 percentages.
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est liberal (Blackmun). The percentage score is higher this term for
every conservative justice (excepting Justice White, less consistently
conservative than the others) and lower for each of the four more liberal justices. Clearly the conservatives voted more as a coalition on the
close cases during the 1988 term than during the preceding two terms.
The same contrast also appears in the composition of the ~oting coalitions in the thirty-four cases decided by a 5-4 vote. In nineteen of the
thirty-four cases, the majority consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and White. In six additional cases
the winning coalition included at least three of the four most consistently conservative justices (Rehnquist, Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia).
Thus, conservatives dominated the winning coalition in 25 of 34, or
73.5% of close cases. During the previous term the corresponding
figures were 17 of 31, or 54.8%. Looking at the liberal end of the scale,
Justices Brennan and Marshall together voted with the majority in 12
of 31 close cases (38.7%) during the 1987 term but in just 7 of 34
(20.6%) such decisions in this term. All of these figures attest to the
shift in the Court's ideological orientation that appears from the issue
tables. If the change is attributable to Justice Kennedy's first full year
on the Court, the newest justice has indeed made a difference.
An examination of the individual tables is now in order.

A.

Civil Cases with Government Opposing a Private Party

Table 1 lists summary percentages and the number of times each
justice voted for and against the state government in a civil dispute with
a private litigant. Table 2 gives the same kind of data for civil disputes
between the federal government and private parties. Inspection of the
rankings shows no special surprises; the conservative justices are at the
top (pro-government) of the scale and the liberal justices are at the
bottom. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who fell almost to the middle of the
rankings on the federal table last year (when many observers believed
he was treading cautiously with his eight-member Court most of the
term), regained his customary spot at the top of the list. In the same
table Justice Blackmun edged out Justice Scalia for the number five
ranking, but only by 1.4 percentage points. Last year Justice Kennedy,
participating in fewer than half of the Court's decisions, was squarely
at the midpoint of both tables. This year he has moved a little closer to
the top. Justice O'Connor showed the biggest individual change on either table, dropping nearly 16 percentage points and from first to
fourth place in the federal rankings. The greatest variations in the state
table all occurred at the bottom of the list-Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun each declined 13-14 percentage points in their support of the
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state. As in past years, the federal government prevailed in a somewhat
larger percentage of its cases than did the states.
Examination of the state cases (Table 1) in which justices at the
extremes voted contrary to their anticipated pro- or anti-government
leanings shows that the discrepancy is largely accounted for by the
unanimous decisions which, we assume, suggests a government case
strong enough to transcend ideological differences. Chief Justice Rehnquist, at the top of the scale, voted only twice against the state when the
Court was divided. One was the City of Richmond reverse discrimination case, discussed above, in which a vote against the city was the
conservative position. The other case was an 8-1 decision in which only
Justice Stevens was willing to uphold Michigan's tax exemption for
retirement benefits of state (but not federal) employees against a challenge based on preemption and alleged violation of intergovernmental
tax immunity. 111 At the bottom of the scale Justices Brennan and Marshall voted only once for the government in a divided vote, and that was
in City of Richmond. Their liberal voting record in this category was
therefore perfect.
In Table 2, civil cases involving a federal government party, most
of the unexpected votes occurred in unanimous decisions. Five of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's and five of Justice White's votes against the government were in this category. The other three, for each justice, were
an odd assortment of cases with little obvious ideological content. Two
of Justice Rehnquist's were 8-1 decisions, one a tax case holding the
taxpayer was entitled to capital gains treatment on a stock transaction 16
and the other a decision under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requiring the Department of Justice to make available, on request, copies of district court decisions the Department receives in the course of
litigating tax cases. 17 His third anti-government vote was cast with the
majority in Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa, 18 a 5-4 decision holding that a federal district court
15. Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1500 (1989). Justice Scalia, in addition,
voted against the government in Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2491 (1989) (Connecticut's
attempt to regulate price of beer in other states violates commerce clause); Missouri v. Jenkins,
109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989) (eleventh amendment does preclude attorney fee award against state); and
Barnard v. Thorstenn, 109 S.Ct. 1294 (1989) (Virgin Islands' residency requirement for bar admission violates privileges and immunities clause). Justice O'Connor, in addition to City of Richmond, Davis, and jenkins, voted against the government in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S.
Ct. 3086 (1989) (display of creche violates establishment clause); and Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989) (sales tax exemption for religious periodicals violates establishment
clause).
16. Commissioner v. Clark, 109 S. Ct. 1455 (1989).
17. United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 109 S. Ct. 2841 (1989).
18. 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989).
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may not require an unwilling attorney to represent an indigent defendant in a civil case. Justice White stood with the Chief Justice in Mallard and in the FOIA case and cast his third vote against the government in Frank v. Minnesota Newspaper Association, Inc. 19 His dissent
in Frank (along with Marshall and Stevens) related only to its formal
disposition, not to its substance, since he would have affirmed the decision below. The majority found the appeal moot.
At the bottom of the scale, Justice Brennan voted for the government only twice and Justice Marshall three times in a divided Court.
Both upheld the IRS in a dispute with a large life insurance company.20 Their sympathies for the underdog were perhaps not evoked by
a well-heeled business corporation. Justice Brennan's other pro-government vote was in Frank, where, as noted above, the distinction between
the six in the majority and the three dissenters was merely technical. 21
Justice Marshall's other two votes for the government came in Mallard22 (to require an unwilling attorney to perform pro bono services
for indigents) and Hernandez v. Commissioner, 23 a decision disallowing certain payments to the Church of Scientology as charitable deductions. His Mallard vote was clearly a vote for the underdog; his support for the IRS in Hernandez is not readily explicable on ideological
grounds.

B.

Criminal Cases

The two criminal case tables (Tables 3 and 4), as in previous
terms, reflect the same ideological divisions as the civil case tables, but
the voting is somewhat more polarized. In the state cases, Justices
Brennan and Marshall voted for the prosecution more often than last
year, but three of these decisions were unanimous. Marshall's one other
uncharacteristic vote was a lone dissent in Olden v. Kentucky, 24 addressed not to the merits but to the Court's summary disposition of the
case. 211 Justice Brennan's two votes for the government in non-unani19. 109 S. Ct. 1734 (1989).
20. Colonial Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2408 (1989).
21. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. In fact, only by contrast to the dissent could
the majority position be called a vote for government. Frank, the Postmaster General, had already
agreed to everything the Minnesota Newspaper Association wanted, which made the case moot,
according to the majority. Declaring the case moot, however, was technically more favorable to
Frank than affirming the decision below as the dissent would have done.
22. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
23. 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989).
24. 109 S. Ct. 480 (1988).
25. Justice Marshall has repeatedly objected to summary reversals, insisting that the Court
should not reverse a lower court decision without the benefit of full briefing and oral argument.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 109 S. Ct. 205 (1988); Rhodes v. Stewart, 109 S. Ct. 202
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mous decisions 26 are less easily explained, but neither case involved a
closely divided Court. In one of them 27 Justice Marshall provided the
lone dissent. In the other28 Justice Stevens joined Justice Marshall, but
neither dissented on the merits. Justice Marshall objected once again to
summary reversal without the benefit of full briefings, and both
thought the case too insignificant to justify granting certiorari in the
first instance.
Among the conservative members of the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist favored the criminal defendant in only two non-unanimous
state cases, 29 and each of them had only a single dissenter. One of the
cases was Olden, where Justice Marshall objected to the summary reversal rather than to the merits of the decision. The other case, 30 over
the sole objection of Justice Kennedy, held that the "plain statement"
rule of Michigan v. Long31 (as a basis for declining review of a state
court decision reached on "adequate and independent state grounds")
was applicable to federal habeas corpus proceedings as well as to direct
review. Justice Kennedy's three non-unanimous votes against the government came in Olden, Texas v. johnson (the flag burning case), 32
and Penson v. Ohio, 33 where all members of the Court except Chief
Justice Rehnquist agreed that the Ohio court failed to follow proper
procedures in allowing appointed counsel to withdraw from the case. 3 "
Table 3 shows a division of the Court into two distinct groups-five
who voted overwhelmingly in favor of the government and four who
voted consistently in favor of the defendant. The gap between Justice
Scalia and Justice Blackmun is a remarkable 37.1 percentage points.
Table 4 (federal criminal cases), involves fewer decisions and ex(1988); Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 485 U.S. 265 (1988).
26. Alabama v. Smith, 109 S. Ct. 2201 (1989), and Bruder, 109 S. Ct. at 205.
27. Smith, supra note 26
28. Bruder, supra. note 25
29. Olden, 109 S. Ct. at 480; Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989).
30. See Harris, supra note 29.
31. 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983).
32. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
33. I 09 S. Ct. 346 (1988).
34. Justice O'Connor voted four times against the government in non-unanimous decisions:
Olden, Penson, Harris, and Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989). In Penry she voted to
affirm the lower court's holding that the eighth amendment does not categorically prohibit capital
punishment for a mentally retarded person, the most significant holding in the case; but she voted
to reverse Penry's conviction because of an error in mitigation instructions. Justice White also had
four non-unanimous pro-defendant votes: Olden, Penson, Harris, and South Carolina v. Gathers,
109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989), in which he joined the four more liberal members of the Court in overturning a death penalty sentence. Justice Scalia had five non-unanimous votes in support of the
defendant: Olden, Penson, Harris, Johnson, and Jones v. Thomas, 109 S. Ct. 2522 (1989), a
decision rejecting a double jeopardy claim from which he dissented, along with Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens.
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hibits a more gradual progression in the rankings from very frequent to
very infrequent support of the prosecution. As in previous years, the
government's success rate in federal cases is higher than in state cases.
Justices Rehnq uist, Kennedy and White voted against the prosecution
only once, and that decision was unanimous. Justices Brennan and
Marshall voted for the prosecution only once in a case when the Court
was divided. 311 That decision, Mistretta v. United States, 36 upheld the
constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, with only Justice Scalia dissenting. This year's figures seem to confirm what last
year's figures suggested about Justice Kennedy-he is noticeably more
prosecution-oriented than his predecessor Justice Powell. 37

C.

Individual Rights

Tables 5, 6, and 7 deal with claims of constitutional and statutory
rights. Table 5 (first amendment claims) and Table 7 (statutory civil
rights claims) show the same broad voting patterns as Tables 1 through
4 (government versus private party claims). There are slight variations
in the rankings, but Justices Brennan and Marshall, followed by Justices Blackmun or Stevens, are at one extreme in both scales. Chief
Justice Rehnquist is at the other extreme, followed in varying order by
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and White. Justices Kennedy and
Scalia are noticeably more centrist on first amendment issues, while
Justices O'Connor and White are more centrist on statutory civil rights
issues. Table 6 (equal protection claims), does not show as clear a voting pattern but generally points in an unexpected direction, with conservatives supporting civil rights claims more frequently and liberals
opposing them. This table, as explained above, 38 is entirely misleading.
All of the decisions but one were unanimous, six justices did not participate in one or more of the decisions, and the facts of the one split
decision, City of Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 39 were so postured that
a vote for the city was a vote in favor of minority rights.
Table 5 (first amendment claims) follows the anticipated distribution, and the fit is even closer when cases without dissent are eliminated. In the split decisions, Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to
uphold the first amendment claim in every instance, while the Chief
35. Justice Marshall is shown in Table 4 with three pro-government votes to Justice Brennan's two because Justice Brennan did not participate in United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619
(1989), an otherwise unanimous decision.
36. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
37. Riggs and Moss, supra note 1, at 61-65.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
39. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
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Justice and Justices White and O'Connor voted against it in every case.
Justices Kennedy and Scalia, however, parted company with their conservative brethren in two important cases, giving the liberals the margin of victory in Texas v. johnson 40 and Florida Star v. B.]. F. 41 Justice Blackmun, who supported most first amendment claims in the two
previous terms, voted this term to reject most of them.
Table 7 (statutory civil rights) also has few surprises. Justices
Marshall and Brennan voted to uphold every statutory civil rights
claim presented to the Court except in one unanimous decision. 42 At
the conservative end, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not support a single
civil rights claim in any decision marked by one or more dissents. Justice Scalia voted in favor of one such claim, 43 Justice Kennedy two,""
and Justice O'Connor three. 411 Table 7 thus presents a nice ranking of
members of the Court in descending order of predilection to construe
broadly the protections granted by civil rights statutes.

D. jurisdiction and justiciability Questions
Table 8 (jurisdiction claims) conforms in general outline to our
initial assumptions about judicial restraint-the liberal justices appearing more inclined to exercise jurisdiction and the conservative justices
less so. Justice White is at the mid-point of the scale, which comports
with his past reputation as a swing-voter, although the biggest break in
the table is the ll percentage point gap between him and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Rehnquist. The number of jurisdiction and
justiciability questions is large every term, but often the issue is not
40. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (invalidating the Texas flag desecration statute).
41. 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989) (reversing a judgment imposing damages on a newspaper for
publishing the name of a victim of sexual assault, contrary to state law).
42. City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989). This was a § 1983 action against the
city for failure to provide medical treatment for the emotional illness of a person who was in police
custody for about one hour. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Kennedy and Scalia, wrote an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which would have entered judgment outright for
the city rather than remanding. This was another case difficult to classify. The city was petitioner;
hence all ruled in the city's favor. On that basis we classified this as a unanimous decision. In at
least one other case of this nature, discussed supra note 20 and accompanying text, we classified
the case as a split decision. Here the nine were so much in agreement that we decided to disregard
the partial dissent.
43. Missouri v. Jenkins, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989). Two separate issues were raised-one pertaining to the enhancement of an attorney fee award under § 1988 and the other to the enhancement of law clerk and paralegal fees. Only the Chief Justice was opposed to the claim relating to
law clerk and paralegal fees.
44. Id. Kennedy supported the right to enhancement on both issues.
45. ld. (the law clerk and paralegal claim); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775
(1989) (employer's burden of proof in a Title VII discrimination case); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109
S. Ct. 454 (1988) (dissented from holding that NCAA was not a state actor).
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substantial enough to draw a single dissent. As shown by the figures on
the second row from the bottom, the issue was disputed in only sixteen
of the thirty-seven instances. The rankings in Table 8 are largely as
expected, although the percentage differences are small. These differences are amplified when only the non-unanimous decisions are tabulated, as follows:

I ustice

For

I urisdiction

Against

o/o For

Marshall

14

1

93.3

Stevens

14

2

87.5

Brennan

12

2

75.0

Blackmun

11

5

68.8

White

10

6

62.5

O'Connor

6

9

40.0

Kennedy

6

10

37.5

Rehnquist

6

10

37.5

Scalia

6

10

37.5

Using these numbers, the total spread is 56 percentage points (compared with 25 percentage points in Table 8), and a gap of 25 percentage points emerges between Justices White and O'Connor. If judicial
restraint is identified with reluctance to exercise jurisdiction, it is also
strongly identified-this year at least-with the judicial conservatives
on the Court. Conversely, activism, as measured by willingness to exercise jurisdiction in a disputed case, characterizes the liberal members of
the Court. 46

E.

Federalism Issues

Table 9 (federalism issues), used for the first time in last year's
analysis of the 1987 term, 47 deals with issues raised by conflict between
federal and state governmental authority. Federalism, for purposes of
this category, includes such matters as preemption, intergovernmental
taxation, application of the tenth and eleventh amendments, and federal
court interference with state court activities (other than review of state
court decisions). Table 9 does not include cases in which the only conflict is alleged incompatibility of the state action with the United States
46. Justice Marshall, who came closest to a perfect record in the revised table, cast his sole
vote against the exercise of jurisdiction in Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989), the Birmingham firefighters case. Such a vote, had it been a majority, would have barred a challenge by white
firefighters to a previously decreed affirmative action program.
47. See Riggs and Moss, supra note 1, at 65.
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Constitution. Nor does it include issues of "horizontal" (interstate) federalism, arising under the dormant commerce clause or the privileges
and immunities clause in response to state-erected barriers to interstate
commerce.
In examining issues of federalism, we assume that the more conservative justices-Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy-would
tend to favor state authority, while Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun would tend to support federal authority. For the 1987 term
reported last year, 48 the results were more or less the reverse of what
we expected: Justices Brennan and Marshall appeared most supportive
of the state; Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens were in the
middle; and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, White, and Scalia were the
least supportive. We explained this anomaly by reference to the relatively few split decisions (six of thirteen in the table) and the specific
subject matter of the disputes which led the liberals to support the state
position more frequently than the conservatives. 49 This explanation, in
retrospect, is still plausible. For the 1988 term, however, no such explanation is necessary because the ranking of the justices in Table 9
falls cleanly into the anticipated pattern. 60

F.

Swing-Vote Analysis

Table 10 shows the number of times each justice voted with the
majority in cases close enough to be decided by a single vote. For the
1988 term, we identified thirty-four such decisions made by a 5 to 4
vote. 51 In such cases, a shift of any one justice from the majority to the
minority coalition would have created a new majority and a different
result. We call this "swing-vote" analysis because each member of the
majority is in a position to swing the decision one way or the other,
assuming the other votes remain constant. Because each vote is crucial
to the outcome, frequency of voting with the majority in such cases may
48. /d. at 65, 75-76.
49. Id. at 75-77.
50. If the 10 decisions without dissent are excised, the ordering changes only
slightly-O'Connor and Kennedy change places. Nor are the percentages changed substantially
for the top six justices. The pro-United States position of the bottom three justices, however,
becomes much more pronounced. Justice Blackmun moves from 40.9o/o for the state to 16. 7%,
while Justices Marshall and Brennan at 33.3% and 31.8%, respectively, fall to 0% support of the
state.
51. This is the usual "close case." During the preceding term, however, when the Court
consisted of only eight members before Justice Kennedy's confirmation, we included in the swingvote category 14 cases decided 5-4, 14 decided 5-3, and 3 decided 4-3. Seven additional 5-3 decisions were not included because they were affirmances rather than reversals of a lower court
decision. With 5-3 affirmances, the shift of one vote would not change the outcome because the
case would be affirmed without opinion by a 4-4 vote.
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be regarded as one index of influence on Court decision-making.
The archetypical swing voter on the Court is a person not ideologically committed to a liberal or a conservative position who votes sometimes with one group and sometimes with the other, making the crucial
difference on close cases. Justice White has occupied this position in
recent years, as did Justice Powell before his retirement. 52 During the
1987 term, Justice White was the most frequent swing voter in a Court
that drew its winning coalitions in close cases more often from conservatives than liberals. This year, however, Justice Kennedy was the most
frequent swing voter, joining the majority on twenty-eight of thirtyfour issues, followed by Justices White, O'Connor, and the Chief Justice, each with twenty-six votes, and Scalia with twenty-five. In the
same thirty-four decisions, the four liberal members of the
Court-Blackmun, Brennan, Stevens, and Marshall-voted with the
majority 13, 9, 9, and 8 times, respectively. This configuration suggests
very little shifting from one group to another by the high scorers, and a
conservative bloc quite consistently defeating the liberals. Justice Kennedy voted on the liberal side twice to gain his edge over the Chief
J ustice 113 but never voted with the liberals in a losing cause. Justice
O'Connor joined the liberals to make a winning coalition four
times-more than any other conservative, 114 but also voted with them
four times on the losing side. 1111 Chief Justice Rehnq uist, tied at second
from the top, never voted in a winning coalition dominated by liberal
justices in a 5-4 decision. 116 Voting conservative was good enough to
score high in the swing-vote table this term.

52. See, e.g., Bender, Book Review, 82 MICH. L. REv. 635 (1984) (reviewing V. BLASI,
THE BURGER CoURT (1983); Fallon, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 I-IARV. L.
Rt:v. 399 ( 1987).
53. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (Oag desecration), and Pittston Coal Group v.
Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414 (1988) (favoring black-lung disease claimants).
54. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 1119 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (creche violates establishment
clause); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994
(1989) (tribe has right to zone land on reservation); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989)
(mitigation instruction in sentencing proceeding erroneous); Sullivan v. Hudson, I 09 S. Ct. 2248
(1989) (social security claimant may be awarded attorney fees).
55. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989) (with
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens); Schmuck v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1443 (1989) (with Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 109 S. Ct. 1026 (1989) (with
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988) (with Brennan,
Marshall, and White).
56. The closest he came was Schmuck, 109 S. Ct. 1443 (odometer tampering case in which
he voted to affirm the conviction, along with Justices Blackmun, Stevens, White, and Kennedy).
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CoNCLUSION

As in previous years, our discussion has highlighted some of the
relationships appearing in patterns of Supreme Court voting without
exhausting all credible interpretations of the data. The availability of
information for previous terms gives an important temporal dimension
to the analysis which, over the years, should add to the value of this
report. In last year's report on the 1987 term, the tables did not show
any major changes from the preceding term, either for individual justices or for the Court as a whole, despite the addition of Justice Kennedy for the last few months of the term. 67 The 1988 term was a different story. The whole Court shifted to the right, as detailed above, and,
on the basis of full participation in the decided cases, Justice Kennedy
moved closer to the conservative pole in several tables. There was also a
tendency for the Court to be more polarized, with a greater point
spread between the extremes of some of the tables: scores at the top of
the tables are higher than last term, and scores at the bottom are lower.
It is possible that the shift toward conservatism during the 1988 term
may in retrospect appear only aberrational. However, given the present
membership of the Court and what is known about their individual
propensities, the 1988 term will likely be seen as part of a longer range
swing of the pendulum.

V.

APPENDIX

A.

Explanation of Criteria for Selection and Classification of Cases

1.

The universe of cases

Only cases decided during the 1988 term by a full opinion setting
forth reasons for the decision are included in the data. Decisions on
motions are excluded even if accompanied by an opinion. Cases handled by summary disposition are included if accompanied by a full
opinion for the Court, but not if the only opinion is a dissent. Cases
decided by a 4-4 vote, hence resulting in affirmance without written
opinion, are excluded. Both signed and per curiam opinions are considered full opinions if they set forth reasons in a more than perfunctory
manner. Cases not fitting into any of the ten categories are, of course,
not included in the data base for any of the tables.
57. Riggs and Moss, supra note 1, at 61-65, 78. "Justice Kennedy," we sdid, "seems to have
had little effect on the orientation of the Court during the 1987 term. To the extent of his participation, his voting behavior is quite comparable to that of his predecessor Justice Powell (except,
perhaps, for a somewhat tougher attitude toward criminal defendants)." /d. at 78.
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Cases classified as civil or criminal

Classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly accepted definitions; generally the nature of the case is clearly identified
in the opinion. Last year one case, Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624
(1988), raised a difficult problem of classification because the outcome
of the case hinged on whether the contempt citation was found to be
civil or criminal. The case was remanded for a lower court determination of the issue, and we classified it as criminal because the lower
courts had previously acted on that assumption. This year Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 ( 1989)
presented another difficult choice. The action was brought by attorneys,
not themselves charged with a crime, to adjudicate their interest in
property of their client that had been forfeited under the provisions of
21 U.S.C. Section 853, a criminal statute. Because it interpreted a
criminal statute and was incident to a criminal proceeding, we classified
the case as criminal.

3.

Cases classified by nature of the parties

Cases are included in Tables 1 through 4 only if governmental
and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is necessarily true
of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded if they do not satisfy this
criterion. The governmental entity might be the government itself, one
of its agencies or officials, or, with respect to state government, one of
its political subdivisions. If both a state and a federal entity are parties
to the same suit, on the same side, with only private parties on the
other, the case is included in both Tables 1 and 2. A case is included
more than once in the same table if it raises two or more distinct issues
affecting the outcome of the case and the issues are resolved by differing
voting alignments.
A suit against an official in his personal capacity is included if he
is represented by government attorneys or the interests of the state are
otherwise clearly implicated. In instances of multiple parties, a civil
case is excluded if governmental entities appear on both sides of the
controversy. This rule was applied, for example, to exclude Martin v.
Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (the firefighters case) from Tables 1 and
2 because the City of Birmingham and Jefferson County were parties
to the case on one side and the United States was a plaintiff-intervenor
on the other side.
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Classification by nature of the issue

A case is included in each category (Tables 5 through 9) for which
it raises a relevant issue that is addressed in the written opinion(s). One
case may thus be included in two or more tables. A case is also included
more than once in the same table if it raises two or more distinct issues
in that category affecting the disposition of the case and the issues are
resolved by differing voting alignments. A case is not included for any
issue which, though raised by one of the litigants, is not addressed in
any opinion.
Identification of first amendment and equal protection issues poses
no special problem. In each instance the nature of the claim is expressly
identified in the opinion. Issues of speech, press, association and free
exercise of religion are included. Establishment clause cases are excluded, however, because one party's claim of religious establishment is
often arrayed against another party's claim of free exercise, or some
other individual right, thus blurring the issue of individual rights.
Cases included in Table 7, statutory civil rights claims, are limited
to those invoking relevant sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended; the Voting Rights Act of 1965; the civil rights statutes appearing in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (1982); and other federal statutes
expressly barring discrimination on the basis of race, color, national
origin, sex, religion, age, or physical handicap. Actions brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 are included if the substantive right asserted is based
on a federal statute or if the issue is the application of § 1983-that is,
whether or how the statutory protections apply in the case at hand.
However, § 1983 actions are excluded if the substantive right asserted
is based on the United States Constitution and the issue relates to that
right. The purpose of the § 1983 exclusion is to preserve a distinction
between constitutional and non-constitutional claims.
For Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include not
only jurisdiction per se but also standing, mootness, ripeness, abstention, equitable discretion, and justiciability. Jurisdictional questions are
excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no member of the
Court dissents on the question, even though the Court may comment on
its jurisdiction.
Table 9 (federalism cases) is limited to issues raised by conflicting
actions of federal and state or local governments. Common examples
are preemption, intergovernmental immunities, application of the tenth
and eleventh amendments as a limit on action by the federal government, and federal court interference with state court activities (other
than review of state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal" federalism
or interstate relationships, such as those raised by the dormant com-
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merce clause or the privileges and immunities clause, are excluded from
the table.

B.

Cases Included in Statistical Tables*

Table 1: Civil Cases: State I Local Government versus Private Party
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 109 S. Ct. 633
(1989).
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, New Jersey Dep't
of Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1617 (1989).
Barnard v. Thorstenn, 109 S. Ct. 1294 (1989).
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939 (1989).
Board of Estimate v. Morris, 109 S. Ct. 1433 (1989).
Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989).
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989).
Brower v. County of Inyo, 109 S. Ct. 1378 (1989).
California v. Arc America Corp., 109 S. Ct. 1661 (1989).
California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2228 ( 1989).
City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989).
City of Dallas v. Stangl in, 109 S. Ct. 1591 (1989).
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989).
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1500 (1989).
Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989).
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998
(1989).
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 109 S. Ct. 609 (1989).
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 109 S. Ct. 1013
(1989).
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989).
Goldberg v. Sweet, 109 S. Ct. 582 (1989).
Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
Hardin v. Straub, 109 S. Ct. 1998 (1989).
Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2491 (1989).
• Cases listed more than once are those with more than one voting alignment within the
category.
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Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct.
2818 (1989).
Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989).
Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 109 S. Ct. 1904 ( 1989).
Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989).
Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989).
Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (1989).
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct.
2506 ( 1989).
North W. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 109 S. Ct.
1262 ( 1989).
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 109 S. Ct. 1519 (1989).
Owens v. Okure, 109 S. Ct. 573 (1989).
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 2854 ( 1989).
Quinn v. Millsap, 109 S. Ct. 2324 (1989).
Rhodes v. Stewart, 109 S. Ct. 202 (1988).
Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 109 S. Ct. 278 (1988).
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989).
Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland lndep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct.
1486 (1989).
Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 109 S. Ct. 276
( 1988).
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989).

Table 2: Civil Cases: Federal Government versus Private Party
American Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 109 S. Ct. 1693 (1989).
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 109 S. Ct. 468 (1988).
Carlucci v. Doe, 109 S. Ct. 407 (1988).
Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 109 S.
Ct. 1361 (1989).
Colonial Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2408 (1989).
Commissioner v. Clark, 109 S. Ct. 1455 (1989).
Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Ticktin, 109 S. Ct. 1626 (1989).
Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989).
Frank v. Minnesota Newspaper Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1734 (1989).
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989).
Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct.
2818 (1989).
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 109 S. Ct.
1814 (1989).
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Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 109 S. Ct. 1851 (1989).
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384
(1989).
Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414 (1988).
Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558
(1989).
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835 (1989).
Sable Communications v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 109 S. Ct.
2829 (1989).
Sable Communications v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 109 S. Ct.
2829 (1989).
Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 109 S. Ct. 1726 (1989).
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
Sullivan v. Hudson, 109 S. Ct. 2248 (1989).
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989).
United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 109 S. Ct. 1468 (1989).
United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 109 S. Ct. 2841 (1989).
United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989).
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 109 S. Ct. 1026 (1989).
United States v. Stuart, 109 S. Ct. 1183 ( 1989).

Table 3: State Criminal Cases
Alabama v. Smith, 109 S. Ct. 2201 (1989).
Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988).
Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 109 S. Ct. 1289 (1989).
Carella v. California, 109 S. Ct. 2419 (1989).
Castille v. Peoples, 109 S. Ct. 1056 (1989).
Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989).
Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989).
Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989).
Hildwin v. Florida, 109 S. Ct. 2055 (1989).
Jones v. Thomas, 109 S. Ct. 2522 (1989).
Lockhart v. Nelson, 109 S. Ct. 285 (1988).
Maleng v. Cook, 109 S. Ct. 1923 (1989).
Massachusetts v. Morash, 109 S. Ct. 1668 (1989).
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 109 S. Ct. 2633 ( 1989).
Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
Olden v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 480 (1988).
Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 109 S. Ct. 205 (1988).
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
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Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346 (1988).
Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594 (1989).
South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989).
Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).

Table 4: Federal Criminal Cases
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646
(1989).
Gomez v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989).
Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1494 (1989).
Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
Schmuck v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1443 (1989).
United States v. Broce, 109 S. Ct. 757 (1989).
United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).
United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619 (1989).

Table 5: Cases Raising a Challenge to First Amendment Rights of
Expression, Association, and Free Exercise
Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989).
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591 (1989).
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 109 S. Ct. 1013
(1989).
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989).
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678
(1989).
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989).
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 109 S. Ct. 2633 (1989).
Sable Communications v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 109 S. Ct.
2829 (1989).
Sable Communications v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 109 S. Ct.
2829 (1989).
Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989).
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989).
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
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Table 6: Cases Involving Equal Protection Claims
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 109 S. Ct. 633
(1989).
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, New Jersey Dep't
of Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1617 (1989).
Board of Estimate v. Morris, 109 S. Ct. 1433 (1989).
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591 (1989).
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
Quinn v. Millsap, 109 S. Ct. 2324 (1989).

Table 7: Cases Involving Statutory Civil Rights Claims
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939 (1989).
City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989).
Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
Hardin v. Straub, 109 S. Ct. 1998 (1989).
Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732
(1989).
Jett v. Dallas lndep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989).
Lorance v. A.T. & T. Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989).
Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989).
Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989).
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
Owens v. Okure, 109 S. Ct. 573 (1989).
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 2854 (1989).
Rhodes v. Stewart, 109 S. Ct. 202 (1988).
Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct.
1486 (1989).
Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 109 S. Ct. 276
(1988).
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989).

Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of jurisdiction
American Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 109 S. Ct. 1693 (1989).
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 109 S. Ct. 683
(1989).
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 109 S. Ct. 683
(1989).
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Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 109 S. Ct. 2037 (1989).
Castille v. Peoples, 109 S. Ct. 1056 ( 1989).
City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989).
Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 109 S.
Ct. 1361 (1989).
Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989).
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 109 S. Ct. 609 (1989).
Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Ticktin, 109 S. Ct. 1626 (1989).
Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989).
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
Frank v. Minnesota Newspaper Ass'n, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1734 (1989).
Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989).
Hildwin v. Florida, 109 S. Ct. 2055 (1989).
Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct.
2818 (1989).
Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 109 S. Ct. 1976 (1989).
Maleng v. Cook, 109 S. Ct. 1923 (1989).
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 109 S. Ct.
1814 (1989).
Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 109 S. Ct. 2633 ( 1989).
Mesa v. California, 109 S. Ct. 959 (1989).
Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1494 (1989).
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. 1597
(1989).
Mjssouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989).
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 109 S. Ct. 2218 (1989).
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct.
2506 (1989).
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 109 S. Ct. 1519 (1989).
Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 109 S. Ct. 987 (1989).
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558
(1989).
Quinn v. Millsap, 109 S. Ct. 2324 (1989).
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989).
United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 109 S. Ct. 2841 (1989).
United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619 ( 1989).
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 109 S. Ct. 1248
(1989).
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
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Table 9: Cases Raising a Federalism Issue
Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 109 S. Ct. 2037 (1989).
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989).
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989).
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971 (1989).
California v. Arc Am. Corp., 109 S. Ct. 1661 (1989).
California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2228 ( 1989).
Castille v. Peoples, 109 S. Ct. 1056 (1989).
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989).
Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1500 (1989).
Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397 ( 1989).
Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct.
2818 (1989).
Mansell v. Mansell, 109 S. Ct. 2023 (1989).
Massachusetts v. Morash, 109 S. Ct. 1668 (1989).
Mesa v. California, 109 S. Ct. 959 (1989).
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. 1597
(1989).
Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989).
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct.
2506 (1989).
North W. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 109 S. Ct.
1262 (1989).
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 109 S. Ct. 1519 (1989).
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 109 S. Ct. 278 (1988).
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 109 S. Ct. 1248
(1989).

Table 10: Swing-vote Cases
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
109 S. Ct. 2994 ( 1989).
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646
(1989).
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989).
Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989).
Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989).
Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989).
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Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).
Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct.
2818 (1989).
Jett v. Dallas lndep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989).
Jones v. Thomas, 109 S. Ct. 2522 (1989).
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 109 S. Ct.
1814 (1989).
Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384
(1989).
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989).
Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414 (1988).
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/ Am. Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917
(1989).
Schmuck v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1443 (1989).
South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989).
Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
Sullivan v. Hudson, 109 S. Ct. 2248 (1989).
Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
U~ited States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 109 S. Ct. 1026 (1989).
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989).

